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ABSTRACT
A growing body of evidence indicates that positive contact with outgroups
improves attitudes towards those outgroups. Unfortunately, those with the most negative
attitudes towards outgroups often have the fewest opportunities to meaningfully interact
with members of those groups. These studies investigate the effects of imagining
intergroup contact with a Muslim person on measures of explicit (Studies 1 and 2) and
implicit (Study 2) anti-Muslim prejudice among the most ideologically intolerant
individuals. Local and national participants were asked to complete a short imaginative
exercise followed by a brief online questionnaire. Results indicate that imagined
intergroup contact was effective in improving attitudes towards Muslims, even among
those who were the most prejudiced and ideologically intolerant. We discuss the
implications of these findings, as well as potential applications for imagined intergroup
contact interventions, including international relations/diplomacy, and classroom
diversity initiatives.

"Imagination is more important than knowledge. Knowledge is limited. Imagination
encircles the world." – Albert Einstein

“A belief is not merely an idea the mind possesses. It’s an idea that possesses the mind.”
—Robert Oxton Bolton
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Promoting peaceful coexistence between different social groups may be one of
the most important social issues of our time (Crisp & Turner, 2009); however, as a
society, we don’t seem to be very good at it. Indeed, in today’s modernized, globalized,
civilized, and nuclearized world, the notion of “world peace” has become something of a
cliché, relegated to beauty pageants and campaign speeches. Nevertheless, the world
today is interconnected like never before as thoughts, beliefs, opinions, and calls to action
tear across the globe at the speed of light. Now, with ethnic and religious tensions
reaching a critical mass, and an impending clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1993)
looming just over the horizon, it is more important than ever for policymakers and
educators to come equipped with practical and effective means for fostering tolerance and
compassion.
Contact Theory
In 1954, Gordon Allport theorized that prejudice, which he defined as “feeling
favorable or unfavorable, toward a person or thing, prior to, or not based on, actual
experience” (p. 6), could be reduced through contact between members of opposing
groups if participants (a) were of equal social status, (b) cooperatively interacted, (c)
shared common goals, and (d) enjoyed institutional or social support (Allport, 1954).
This notion, known now as the Contact Hypothesis, generated an explosion of interest
and a wealth of supporting research, making it one of the most studied theories in
psychology today (Oskamp & Jones, 2000). Since then, contact theory has proven
effective in improving attitudes toward a wide range of outgroups, including the elderly
(Caspi, 1984), homosexuals (Hodson, 2009), and AIDS victims (Batson et al., 1997), to
name just a few. Equally diverse are the mechanisms thought to mediate contact’s
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prejudice-reducing effects: cognitive dissonance (Aronson & Patnoe, 1997; Miller &
Brewer, 1986), anxiety reduction (Stephan & Stephan, 1985; Turner, Crisp, & Lambert,
2007), functional relations (Sherif et al., 1961), empathy enhancement (Batson et al.,
1997; Finlay & Stephan, 2000), and reduced stereotyping (Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll,
Hermsen, & Russin, 2000). Despite this wealth of empirical support, a number of
practical limitations remain—most notably, issues of opportunity and efficacy.
Prejudice, Religion, and Politics
One of the most obvious drawbacks to using contact as an intervention is that all
too often there are few, if any, opportunities for members of relevant racial, ethnic, or
religious groups to interact (Dovidio et al., 2011). This challenge is particularly
pronounced among ideologically intolerant, highly prejudiced individuals (Allport, 1954;
Amir, 1969). Unfortunately, religion is both highly correlated with measures of
ideological intolerance (Genia, 1996), and pervasive in American society: 85-90% of
Americans report believing in God, nine out of ten report being religiously affiliated—
80% of which identify as Christian—and nearly 40% attend church once a week or more
(Bader et al., 2005; Dougherty, Johnson, & Poulson, 2007). Despite these already
staggering numbers however, American theism appears to be on the rise: according to a
recent Pew Forum poll, Americans’ self-reported belief in God has increased from 8590% in 2005, to 92% in 2007 (Lugo et al., 2008).
These relationships between intergroup attitudes, intergroup contact, ideological
intolerance, and religion don’t just play out in temples and churches, either; as Ronald
Reagan astutely pointed out, Americans often bring their religion with them to the polls
(Reagan, 1984). Indeed, examining the effects of church attendance on attitudes towards
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same-sex marriage, Lugo et al. (2006) found that churchgoing frequency predicts
opposition to same-sex marriage: 82% of those who attend church weekly were opposed,
compared to only 45% who seldom or never attend. Unsurprisingly, frequency of
attendance has also been identified as a strong predictor of conservative ideologies; in
fact, according to the Baylor Religion Survey (Bader et al., 2005), frequency of
attendance was significantly and positively correlated with every measured item from the
Conservative Agenda (“Spend more on the military,” “Advocate Christian values,”
“Punish criminals more harshly,” “Fund faith-based organizations,” and “Allow prayer in
schools”) and significantly and negatively correlated with four of five measured items
from the Liberal Agenda (“Abolish the death penalty,” “Distribute wealth more evenly,”
“Regulate business more closely,” and “Protect the environment more”).
Indeed, Americans’ religious prejudices are reflected quite clearly in their voting
habits as well: according to a 2008 Gallup poll, 53% of Americans surveyed reported
being unwilling to vote for a generally well qualified presidential candidate, nominated
by their own party, if that candidate also happened to be an Atheist; 43% felt the same
way about voting for a homosexual. Other deal breakers were third spouses (30%),
Mormon faith (24%), and being a woman (11%) (Jones, 2008). Though prejudice against
homosexuals and women has decline substantially in recent years, with unwilling rates
dropping to 32% and 6% respectively, religious prejudices in the voting booth have gone
unchanged as unwilling rates for Atheists and Mormons remained static at 49% and 22%
respectively (Saad, 2011).
Clearly, there is something unique about the relationship between religion and
prejudice. Moreover, there seems to be something unique about religion in general, given
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its remarkable ubiquity: “Any characteristic that is this common in a species cries out for
explanation. Why do so many people believe in God?” (Shermer, 2011, p. 165). The
answer, ironically, appears to be evolution, and it may also explain why religion is so
closely related to intergroup prejudice.
The Origins of Religion
Prior to the development of religion, large-scale group cooperation was severely
limited. Though the payoff for such cooperation can certainly be substantial, it requires
considerable self-sacrifice from each individual. Unfortunately, the tendency to free
ride—that is, to reap the benefits of group cooperation without actually contributing to
the effort—is practically irresistible given the tremendous fitness advantages one can
gain from cheating the system (Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011). Methods for
deterring and discriminating against untrustworthy free riders were thus essential for
large groups to develop and operate successfully.
Formally and harshly punishing transgressors is an effective method of
deterrence, if done in a reliable and consistent manner; however, monitoring and
punishing free riders is itself a costly endeavor, and once a majority of the population is
genuinely honest, monitoring for honesty becomes a waste of time (Gervais et al., 2011;
Irons, 1996; Johnson & Bering, 2006). Instead, not monitoring becomes advantageous,
leading to the development of a second-order level of free riding where the problem
begins anew: some individuals contribute to the public good, but skip out on
administering punishment (Irons, 1996; Johnson & Bering, 2006).
While third-party punishment administrators such as court systems and police
forces are popular solutions for enforcing social norms today, Henrich and Boyd (2001)
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point out that large-scale group cooperation existed long before such institutions
developed. Nevertheless, recent investigations into the evolutionary origins of altruism
and group cooperation suggest that punishment may have been outsourced after all.
Indeed, emerging evidence from a number of disciplines supports the notion that the
evolution of religion may have may have been the critical development that first opened
the door for large-scale cooperative efforts (i.e. civilization) by ensuring universal
compliance with prevailing social rules and regulations (Alexander, 1987; Atran &
Norenzayan, 2004; Irons, 1996; Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008).
Two Frameworks for Social Regulation
Two social evolutionary advancements are thought to be primarily responsible for
religion’s development as a solution to the free rider problem. The first is a heightened
tendency to detect agency in nature, which resulted in a pervasive belief in the
supernatural (Johnson & Bering, 2006; Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008). This predisposition
to believe in otherworldly agents ostensibly developed as a means for encouraging
religious affiliation and adherence to a common set of rules and values. To be sure,
social regulations enforced via threats of supernatural or divine punishment have a
number of distinct advantages: there’s no second-order free rider problem, since the
agents do the punishing; because group members do not dole out punishment, reprisals
that might otherwise compromise group integrity are not a concern; and finally,
transgressors can expect to be automatically caught and punished since they are
constantly under watch (Johnson & Bering, 2006). As a result, the social pressures for
individuals to not lie, cheat, or steal became internalized, and self-regulation became the
norm.
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Considerable evidence has been found to support this theory: Roes and Raymond
(2002) have found that, across cultures, the belief in morally concerned supernatural
watchers is positively correlated with group size and cooperation. People also tend to
behave more prosocially (i.e. adhere to social rules and expectations) when reminded of
supernatural agents (Bering, McLeod, & Shackleford, 2005; Shariff & Norenzayan,
2007) just as they behave more prosocially when they suspect being monitored by other
humans (Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006). Indeed, this notion that we as a species are
predisposed to believe in the supernatural is also supported by a number of twin studies
which indicate that anywhere from 41-55% of variance in religious attitudes are
attributable to genetic factors (Waller, Kojetin, Bouchard, Lykken, & Tellegen, 1990;
Eaves, Eysenck, & Martin, 1989). Perhaps most impressively, Shariff and Norenzayan
(2007) have demonstrated that the prosocial priming effects of supernatural stimuli are
found even among self-professed atheists; that is, even those who do not believe in
supernatural watchers respond to thinking about their presence.
The second social evolutionary advancement—an acute sensitivity to reputational
concerns—serves a very different purpose (Johnson & Bering, 2006; Norenzayan &
Shariff, 2008). Having developed prior to—and separately from—religion (Gervais et
al., 2011; Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008), the functional role of this cognitive framework is
just the opposite of the supernatural aspect: active enforcement of social regulations via
informal sanctions (e.g. gossip and shunning). Prior to the development of religion, as
group sizes began to increase and informal methods of sanctioning free loaders became
obsolete, a virtual arms race broke out between honest members of the ingroup, and
mendacious, free loading interlopers: as honest members of society got better at spotting

6

liars, liars got better at deceiving others. Thus, for deterrence to remain an effective
strategy in ensuring strong reciprocal bonds within group, it was imperative that these
untrustworthy transgressors be quickly and reliably detected, excluded, and punished for
their deceit (Henrich, 2006; Irons, 1996; Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008).
Muslim Prejudice and The Modern Model
The modern product of this evolutionary process is perhaps best described as
systemic religious intergroup bias (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002); that is, favorable
attitudes towards those who share our beliefs, and biases against those who don’t. This
can be further resolved into two distinct components: 1) the supernatural component,
which is principally prosocial, self-regulatory, and associated with morality and ethics,
and 2) the categorical component, which is comparatively asocial—at times even
antisocial—and principally concerned with the instinctive desire to enforce the prevailing
belief system by detecting, labeling, and excluding value-violators (i.e. religious outgroup
members) due to their perceived untrustworthiness (Rosik, 2007). Ultimately, however,
the cognitive framework underpinning this second component—which initially evolved
to facilitate and track heuristic assessments of “trustworthiness”—proves to be ill suited
for making more complex “value compliance” judgments—a fact which becomes
abundantly clear when one considers the practical application of such a model.
Take, for instance, an average evangelical’s evaluation of an average Muslim.
Functionally, the primary goal of the evaluation should be the determination of
trustworthiness: recognizing that Islam is a religion, and that religious beliefs equate
with supernatural watchers (which in turn predict prosocial behavior), the logical
conclusion—all things being equal—would be that the Muslim is trustworthy. If,
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however, the values of the supernatural component are allowed to inform the evaluation,
errors are almost certain to ensue: “Because Muslims do not accept Jesus Christ as their
savior, and doing so is the only true way to ensure salvation, Muslims do not share my
value system or fear of God, and are thus untrustworthy.”
Intuitively, were the evangelical to have had previous, positive contact with a
Muslim, his or her outgroup evaluation may not have been quite so ideological or
dogmatic. Absent positive, prior contact with which to inform the heuristic analysis
however, the default standard is quite often the one provided by ideology. This logic is
clearly reflected in a 2006 Gallup poll, which found that personally knowing someone
who is Muslim corresponds with more favorable attitudes: 50% of respondents who were
not acquainted with a Muslim responded favorably to the notion of requiring Muslims to
carry special IDs, compared to 24% of respondents who knew a Muslim—a 26 point
difference. Similarly, while 38% of respondents who were unacquainted with a Muslim
said they would feel nervous being on the same flight as a Muslim, that number dropped
to 20% among those who did know at least one Muslim—an 18 point difference (Saad,
2006).
Consistent with these data are the results of a 2007 Pew Forum Survey, which
reveals that Islam is the most disliked religion in the United States, with 43% of
participants reporting favorable attitudes, 35% reporting unfavorable attitudes, and 22%
expressing no opinion (Lugo, Stencel, Green, & Smith, 2007). The same survey also
found substantial age, education, and political affiliation differences in attitudes towards
Muslims: older, less educated, and more conservative respondents all reported
considerably higher levels of anti-Muslim prejudice than did younger, more educated, or
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more liberal respondents. Moreover, like the Gallup poll, the Pew survey also found that
knowing a Muslim matters: respondents who reported knowing at least one Muslim
responded more favorably to questions about general opinions towards Muslims,
likelihood of voting for a Muslim president, degrees of commonality between
respondents’ religion and Islam, and perceptions of Islam as a violent religion.
Ideological Intolerance
Characterized by value-rigidity, social-rigidity, and need for hierarchy,
ideologically intolerant individuals typically exhibit a simplistic and formulaic
worldview. Religious fundamentalists—characterized by the belief that theirs is the one
true religion, that they have a special relationship with their deity, and that they are
constantly embattled with the forces of evil (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992)—exemplify
this type of thinking. According to Rosik (2007), prejudice expressed by fundamentalists
is often heavily influenced by the “party line” espoused by the religious group they
affiliate with. This finding is consistent with the idea that religiously motivated
prejudices are principally concerned with value violations—a concept which finds further
support in research conducted by Johnson et al. (2011) indicating that religious
fundamentalism (RF) mediates the relationship between religion and homosexual
prejudice, while right-wing authoritarianism mediates the relationship between religion
and racial prejudice.
Indeed, the second measure used here to evaluate ideological intolerance is rightwing authoritarianism (RWA; Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950;
Altemeyer, 2003), which, in contrast to RF, is generally more concerned with securing
against socially threatening outgroups, and ensuring ingroup cohesion and social order
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(Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002). A third construct, distinguished here yet
nonetheless included in these studies is social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto,
Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), which, along with both RF and especially RWA, is
a well-known prejudice predictor (Duckitt et al., 2002; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). SDO is
differentiated here however, because unlike RF & RWA (Genia, 1996), SDO represents
non-religious ideological rigidity. Social dominators are driven by a competitive and
aggressive need for dominance and superiority over other groups, and to that end, they
make strategic use of ideologies that most effectively legitimate their superiority
(Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Just the opposite, RF and RWA are characterized as dogmatic
and inflexible with regards to their religious beliefs (LaBouff, 2011), and they
functionally express prejudice not for aggressive, confrontational purposes, but rather as
an avoidance-oriented threat response to groups they perceive as socially dangerous
(Asbrock, Christ, Duckitt, & Sibley, 2012; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011). Nevertheless,
SDO was included both for exploratory purposes, and due to its high degree of
association with RF and RWA.
Ideologically intolerant persons present a unique challenge for contact theory
given their highly avoidant and highly prejudicial natures: “When groups are highly
segregated, physically or socially, or when there is little motivation to engage in contact,
the benefits of contact may remain unrealized” (Crisp & Turner, 2009, p. 232).
Fortunately, several methods of indirect contact appear to influence intergroup attitudes
as well. According to the extended contact hypothesis, for example, simply knowing that
an ingroup member has a close and positive relationship with an outgroup member is
enough to reduce outgroup prejudice and improve intergroup attitudes (Dovidio, Eller, &
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Hewstone, 2011; Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997). Likewise, imagined
intergroup contact (Turner et al., 2007)—the mental simulation of a positive social
interaction with a member of an outgroup—has also proven to be a viable method for
reducing outgroup bias and improving intergroup relations (Crisp & Turner, 2009). In
fact, since its introduction in 2007, imagined intergroup contact has been consistently
effective at reducing ingroup favoritism (Turner et al., 2007), reducing intergroup anxiety
(Abrams et al., 2008; Husnu & Crisp, 2010a; Turner et al., 2007, Experiments 2 & 3),
improving outgroup evaluations (Husnu & Crisp, 2010a; Turner et al., 2007; Experiments
2 & 3), improving implicit attitudes (Turner & Crisp, 2010), increasing the liklihood of
future contact (Husnu & Crisp, 2010a; Husnu & Crisp, 2010b; Husnu & Crisp, 2011),
and more (cf. Crisp, Husnu, Meleady, Stathi, & Turner, 2010).
The practical implications of these indirect contact theories are tremendous, as
they allow researchers, policymakers, and educators to initiate contact between groups
like religious fundamentalists and right-wing authoritarians, who are not only
predisposed to hate religious and socially threatening outgroups, but also highly unlikely
to otherwise make contact or benefit from it. Given that scholars have harbored concerns
about the efficacy of contact interventions since they were first proposed however, one
has to wonder: just how effective can we expect contact to be among ideologically
intolerance individuals? While this question has only recently begun to receive empirical
investigation, initial results appear promising: a recent literature review considering
contemporary studies of contact on individuals scoring high in measures of cognitive
rigidity revealed that intergroup contact (direct and extended) not only works well—but
often best—among ideologically intolerant and cognitively rigid individuals (Hodson,
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2011). How effective imagined intergroup contact might be in such inimical situations
however is a question that, until now, has yet to be explored.
Here, we hypothesize that imagined intergroup contact will improve both explicit
and implict attitudes, even among ideologically intolerant individuals.
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Study One
Our initial study was designed to replicate and extend previous investigations of
imagined intergroup contact (e.g. Turner et al., 2007). Using a between-groups design,
participants were instructed either to imagine interacting with a Muslim man, or to simply
think about Muslims. Dependent variables focused on explicit intergroup attitudes and
ideological intolerance. We predicted that positive imagined interaction with an outgroup
member would improve intergroup attitudes, even among highly fundamentalist and/or
authoritarian participants.
Methods
Participants
Seventy-five participants diverse in age (39 men, 46 women, Mage = 30.53 years,
SD = 10.239, ages 18 to 60) were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 1 (MTurk),
an online crowdsourcing marketplace for human intelligence tasks. Participants were
somewhat diverse in both religious affiliation (40% no affiliation, 24% Protestant, 17.3%
Catholic, 6.7% Buddhist, 2.7% Hindu, 1.3% Jewish, and 8% selected “other”) and
political orientation (57.3% Liberal, 25.3% Moderate, and 17.3% Conservative) but
predominantly White (77.3%); other racial and ethnic groups comprised only a minority
of the sample (9.3% Black, 6.7% Asian / Pacific Islander, 2.7% Hispanic, 2.7% Native
American, and 1.3% selected “other”). Eligibility was restricted to MTurk users 18 years
of age or older with United States-based IP addresses, and respondents were each
compensated 25¢ for their participation. Because the target outgroup in the experiment

https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome (For a review of MTurk’s validity, see
Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gossling, 2011).
1

13

was Muslims, data from participants who self-identified as Muslim were eliminated prior
to analysis. 2
Materials and Procedure
The present study was conducted using an online survey, powered by Qualtrics, 3
which randomly assigned participants to either an imagined contact condition or a control
condition. Participants assigned to the imagined contact condition were asked to:
“Please spend the next three minutes imagining that you are talking to a Muslim man
who has sat next to you. You spend about thirty minutes chatting until you have to leave
for class. During the conversation you find out some interesting and unexpected things
about him.” Participants were then given three minutes to list as many things as they
could about their imagined interaction. Participants assigned to the control condition
were asked to: “Please spend the next three minutes thinking about Muslims,” and were
afterwards given three minutes to list as many thoughts as they could recall having during
the imagination exercise. This task allowed us to verify that participants had completed
the imagery exercise, and at the same time, reinforced its effect (Turner et al., 2007).
Each page automatically advanced after three minutes elapsed.
Following the manipulation, participants were asked to complete several
dependent measures assessing intergroup attitudes and ideological intolerance, as well as
a series of demographic questions (Please see Appendix A for the complete
questionnaire).

2

Although 91 participants completed the survey, 16 were removed during data cleanup.
Fourteen participants failed to complete the manipulation, one was removed as a
statistical outlier (>3 SDs from the mean anxiety score), and one participant selfidentified as Muslim.
3
http://www.qualtrics.com/
14

Intergroup Attitudes. To assess general outgroup attitudes, participants were
asked to “Please rate how warm or cold you feel toward the following groups” (Muslims,
Christians, Hindus, Arabic Persons, White Persons, and Black or African American
Persons) using a single-item thermometer for each group (0° = coldest feelings, 100° =
warmest feelings). To evaluate intergroup anxiety, participants were instructed to
imagine they were being asked to complete a group project with a Muslim partner, and to
report how “Confident” (reversed), “Irritated,” “Awkward,” “Impatient,” “Frustrated,”
“Stressed,” “Happy” (reversed), “Self-conscious,” and “Defensive” they felt about the
upcoming interaction on a 5-point scale (1 = Clearly does not describe my feelings, 5 =
Clearly describes my feelings; Stephan & Stephan, 1985). Finally, to assess anti-Muslim
prejudice, a modified version of Pratto et al.’s (1994) Anti-Arab Racism scale was also
included. Participants were asked to rate, on a 7-point scale, how positive or negative (1
= Very Negative, 7 = Very Positive) they felt towards the following statements: “Most of
the terrorists in the world today are Muslim,” “Historically, Muslims have made
important contributions to the world culture” (reversed), “Muslims have little
appreciation for democratic values,” “People of the Muslim religion tend to be fanatical,”
and “Muslims value peace and love” (reversed). Order of the explicit attitude measures
was randomized for each participant.
Ideological Intolerance. Participants then completed three measures of various
facets of ideological intolerance. Religious fundamentalism (RF) is the belief that one’s
religious teaching is uniquely true and inerrant, that the followers of this teaching have a
special relationship with a deity, and that they are constantly embattled with the forces of
evil (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). It was assessed with the 12-item revised religious
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fundamentalism scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992), which is not specific to any
single world religion. Participants were asked to rate, on a 9-point scale, how much they
agreed or disagreed (-4 = Very strongly disagree, 4 = Very strongly agree) with each
statement (e.g., “To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one,
fundamentally true religion”; “All of the religions in the world have flaws and wrong
teachings. There is no perfectly true, right religion” [reversed]; “The fundamentals of
God’s religion should never be tampered with, or compromised with others’ beliefs”).
Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) is composed of three interrelated elements—
submissiveness to legitimate authority, conventionalism, and authoritarian
aggressiveness—and was measured using Smith and Winter’s (2002) 10-item
authoritarianism scale. Participants were asked to rate, on a 7-point scale, how much
they agreed or disagreed (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree) with each statement
(e.g., “There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to
ruin it for their godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action”; “It’s
better to have trashy magazines and radical pamphlets in our communities than to let the
government have the power to censor them” [reversed]; “What our country needs most is
discipline, with everyone following our leader in unity”). Recent studies conducted by
Mavor, Macleod, Boal, and Louis (2009) however, indicate that the correlation between
religious fundamentalism and the conventionalism component of authoritarianism create
a statistical artifact that distorts the results of multiple regression analyses by suppressing
the effect of fundamentalism. To remove this artifact, we used only the aggression and
submission components in our analyses.
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For exploratory purposes, we also included a measure of social dominance
orientation (SDO), an indicator of a personal preference for hierarchy within social
systems, which was measured using the Social Dominance Orientation Scale (Prato et al.,
1994). Participants were asked to rate, on a 7-point scale, how positive or negative (1 =
Very negative, 7 = Very positive) they felt toward 14 items (e.g. “Some people are just
inferior to others,” “Increased social equality” [reversed], “This country would be better
off if we cared less about how equal all people were”).
Presentation of the ideological intolerance measures was randomized for each
participant.
Results
As expected, ideological intolerance positively correlated with self-reported
measures of anti-Muslim prejudice, intergroup anxiety, religiosity, and conservative
political orientation (Please see Table 1 for descriptives and correlations).
To further investigate the effects of imagined interaction on outgroup attitudes,
we conducted an analysis of variance (ANOVA) which revealed a significant effect:
participants reported significantly less anti-Muslim prejudice in the imagined interaction
condition (M = 2.46, SD = 1.24) than participants in the control condition (M = 3.38, SD
= 1.47), F(1,72) = 8.07, p = .006. Likewise, participants in the imagined interaction
condition reported significantly less intergroup anxiety (M = 1.80, SD = 0.621) than those
in the control condition (M = 2.49, SD = 0.91), F(1,72) = 12.78, p = .001 (Please see
Table 2).
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Table 2
Means, Standard Deviations, and ANOVAs for Ideological Intolerance and Intergroup
Attitudes by Condition
Imagined
Intergroup
Control Condition
Contact
Attitude Variable
M

SD

M

SD

F

p

Anti-Muslim
Prejudice

2.46

1.24

3.38

1.47

8.07

.006**

Anxiety

1.80

.62

2.48

.91

12.78

.001**

RF

-2.11

2.06

-1.12

2.26

3.66

.060

RWA

2.72

1.30

3.13

1.51

1.49

.226

SDO

2.92

.38

3.38

.63

12.86

.001**

Note: RF = Religious Fundamentalism RWA = Right-wing Authoritarianism, and
SDO = Social Dominance Orientation. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01.

To assess the unique contributions of both the dispositional personality predictors
and the manipulation, we conducted an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) for both antiMuslim prejudice and intergroup anxiety. These analyses revealed that contact explains
unique variability in both anxiety [F(1,65) = 12.25, p = .001] and anti-Muslim prejudice
[F(1,65) = 5.51, p = .022] when simultaneously controlling for measures of ideological
intolerance. Moreover, in a second set of ANCOVAs, imagined intergroup contact
continued to account for unique variability in anxiety—though not anti-Muslim
prejudice—even when simultaneously controlling for religious fundamentalism, rightwing authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation (Please see Tables 3 and 4).
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A multiple regression analysis revealed that none of the ideological intolerance variables
moderated the relationship between imagined contact and explicit attitudes towards
Muslims (Fs ranged from 0.57 to 1.37, ns).
Discussion
The data presented here clearly support our hypotheses that positive imagined
interactions with outgroup members may reduce outgroup prejudices and intergroup
anxiety, even among the ideologically intolerant. While these results are certainly
compelling, the failure of the manipulation to explain unique variability in anti-Muslim
prejudice (when also controlling for SDO) raises an interesting question: Was imagined
intergroup contact simply ineffective at reducing outgroup prejudice, or is some other
factor responsible for the inconsistency? While this is certainly a possibility, an
alternative explanation—given that values approached the floor in the experimental
group—could be that anti-Muslim prejudice was already so low prior to the manipulation
that there was little room left for improvement (Hodson, 2011). On the other hand,
changes in attitude may have been significant, but undetectable due to the betweengroups design. To address this limitation and observe changes in attitudes within
participants, a repeated measures design was required.
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Study Two
In Study 1 we demonstrated that imagined intergroup contact reduces outgroup
prejudice and intergroup anxiety—relative to a control condition—even among
ideologically intolerant individuals. Lacking pretest scores however, we could not
definitively conclude that imagined contact improved individuals’ attitudes towards
Muslims. Thus, in Study 2 we aimed to replicate and extend these findings using a
repeated measures within subjects design. By entering pre-existing attitudes as covariates
in the analyses, we were better able to examine the hypothesis that imagining a positive
interaction with an outgroup member reduces intergroup anxiety and outgroup prejudice.
Study 2 also investigated the relationship between imagined contact and implicit
attitudes. Unlike explicit attitudes—which are conscious, overt, deliberative, and
commonly assessed with self-report measures—implicit attitudes are relatively more
difficult to evaluate due to their covert, involuntary, non-verbal nature (Turner & Crisp,
2010; McConnell & Leibold, 2001). Given that implicit attitudes are not only more
difficult to mask (Turner & Crisp, 2010), but also more resistant to change (Wilson,
Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000), a significant effect of imagined contact on implicit outgroup
prejudice among ideologically intolerant individuals would substantially enhance its
appeal as a prejudice-reduction technique. Encouraged by Turner and Crisp’s (2010)
recent findings demonstrating imagined contact’s efficacy in improving intergroup
attitudes, we included a measure of implicit prejudice in hopes of replicating their results
among ideologically intolerant participants.
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Methods
Participants
Eighty-nine undergraduate students (29 men, 60 women, Mage = 19.51 years, SD =
2.638) were recruited from the psychology department’s participant pool at the
University of Maine. Thirty-eight additional students (16 men, 22 women, Mage = 19.24
years, SD = 1.149) who scored in the top tertile on aggregate measures of right-wing
authoritarianism or religious fundamentalism in the participant pool pre-screen were also
recruited by email. Participants were somewhat diverse with regards to religious
affiliation (29.1% Catholic, 28.3% no affiliation, 28.3% Protestant, 3.1% Buddhist, 2.4%
Jewish, 0.8% Hindu, and 7.9% selected “other”) but predominantly White (86.6%); other
racial and ethnic groups comprised only a minority of the sample (5.5% Asian / Pacific
Islander, 3.9% Native American, 1.6% Black, 0.8% Hispanic, and 0.8% selected “other”).
The prescreen was administered by the University of Maine’s Department of Psychology
in January 2012. Participants were recruited and completed posttest measures between
January 1 and March 15, 2012. Participants received one hour of research credit for their
participation. As in the first study, data from participants who self-identified as Muslim
were eliminated prior to analysis. 4
Materials and Procedure
The procedure was identical to Study 1 except in the following ways. Participants
completed a prescreen prior to the study, which allowed us to control for preexisting
attitudes by using their prescreen scores as covariates during data analysis. In addition to
4

Although 133 participants completed the survey, six were removed during data cleanup.
Four participants failed to complete the manipulation, one was removed as a statistical
outlier (>3 SDs from the mean anxiety score), and one participant self-identified as
Muslim.
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explicit attitudes and ideological intolerance measures, we also included a measure of
implicit attitudes.
Implicit Attitudes. To investigate implicit attitudes towards Muslims we used a
modified version of the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz,
1998), adapted to evaluate attitudes towards Muslims relative to Christians, utilizing the
relatively low-tech IAT approach suggested by Lemm, Lane, Sattler, Kahn, and Nosek
(2008).
While both methods operate on the fundamental assumption that faster responses
reflect closer associations between concepts, the conventional IAT measures the length of
time it takes a participant to sort a fixed number of items (Greenwald et al., 1998), while
the short-form IAT instead tests how many items a participant can sort within a fixed
amount of time (Greenwald et al., 1998; Lemm et al., 2008). Implicit attitudes were
measured using identifiably Christian (Jesus, Church, Bible, Christian, and Gospel) or
Muslim (Muhammad, Islam, Mosque, Muslim, and Koran) target stimuli, and identifiably
pleasant (good, love, terrific, joy, and happy) or unpleasant (hatred, poison, evil, vomit,
and bad) attribute stimuli.
In one example block and two counterbalanced critical blocks, students were
asked to sort stimuli appearing along the left side of the page into one of two columns
marked by specific category pairings (Muslim–Unpleasant/Christian–Pleasant in the
congruent block, and Muslim–Pleasant/Christian–Unpleasant in the incongruent block).
Participants had 30 seconds in each of the critical blocks to quickly categorize as many of
the 40 stimuli as possible by clicking the button in the appropriate column for each
stimulus (e.g. clicking Muslim—Pleasant for Mosque or terrific). Responses were scored
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and analyzed using the “product: square root of difference” approach, wherein the square
root of the difference between the number of items correctly categorized between the two
blocks is multiplied by the ratio of items successfully categorized (Lemm et al., 2008).
Consistent with previous research, faster associations of Muslim—Unpleasant, compared
to Muslim—Pleasant, were interpreted as implicit anti-Muslim prejudices (Rowatt,
Franklin, & Cotton, 2005). The short-form IAT was always the first posttest measure
presented, and each page automatically advanced after the given time elapsed (Please see
Appendix F for an example block).
Results
Consistent with our first study, ideological intolerance positively correlated with
self-reported measures of anti-Muslim prejudice, intergroup anxiety, religiosity, and
conservatism, as did pretest scores and the implicit attitude measure. In fact, scores on
the newly adapted online short-form IAT consistently correlated with both pretest and
posttest measures of ideological intolerance and anti-Muslim prejudice (Please see Table
5 for descriptives and correlations). However, an analysis of covariance using measures
of ideological intolerance as covariates revealed only marginally significant differences
between experimental and control conditions on implicit attitudes towards Muslims, as
assessed by the new short-form IAT (Please see Table 6).
To determine if the manipulation was successful in improving individual
participants’ explicit intergroup attitudes, we conducted analyses of covariance for both
anti-Muslim prejudice and intergroup anxiety using participants’ pretest scores as
covariates. These analyses revealed that condition explained unique variability in antiMuslim prejudice [F(1,93) = 8.53, p = .004, partial eta2 = .084] but not intergroup
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anxiety [F(1,91) = 1.08, p = .303] when simultaneously controlling for preexisting
attitudes and ideological intolerance (Please see Tables 7 and 8).
As in the previous study, a multiple regression analysis was conducted to
determine if the effects of the imagined interaction were mediated by ideological
intolerance. None of the variables used to measure ideological intolerance were found to
moderate the relationship between imagined intergroup contact and explicit attitudes
towards Muslims (Fs ranged from 0.01 to 3.22, ns).
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Discussion
The significant and consistent correlation between implicit Muslim prejudice and
the self-reported measures of explicit anti-Muslim prejudice and ideological intolerance
is compelling evidence of the measure’s validity. Imagined intergroup contact’s inability
to reduce intergroup anxiety is inconsistent with our hypotheses, our previous study, and
previous research that has shown that anxiety mediates the bias-reducing effects of
imagined intergroup contact (Turner et al., 2007). One possible explanation, given the
high levels of variance observed in the self-reported anxiety measure, is that a larger
sample size is required for a sufficiently precise assessment.
Nevertheless, imagined contact’s ability to explain unique variability in antiMuslim prejudices—even when simultaneously controlling for preexisting attitudes,
right-wing authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, and social dominance
orientation—supports our hypothesis that merely imagining a positive interaction with an
outgroup member can improve intergroup attitudes, even among the ideologically
intolerant.
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General Discussion
Consistent with our original hypothesis, we found across two studies that
imagined intergroup contact is effective in improving outgroup attitudes, even among
ideologically intolerant individuals. In Study 1, we demonstrated imagined contact’s
efficacy relative to a control condition using a national sample in a between groups
design. In Study 2, we replicated those findings, and extended them using a repeated
measures within subjects design to confirm that imagined contact could improve
individuals’ attitudes towards Muslims.
To the best of our knowledge, Study 2 marks the inaugural, promising debut of
the online short-form IAT measure. Though we were unable to replicate the significant
effect achieved by Turner and Crisp (2010), a correlational analysis did reveal a negative
relationship between imagined intergroup contact and implicit prejudice towards
Muslims. Given the intractability of implicit attitudes and the novelty of the measure, we
find these results encouraging, and worthy of additional research.
Although Study 2 failed to replicate the anxiety reduction effects demonstrated in
previous research (Abrams et al., 2008; Husnu & Crisp, 2010a; Turner et al., 2007), selfreported levels of intergroup anxiety nearly bottomed out in Study 1 (M = 1.80, SD =
0.621), revealing a large effect size (eta2 = 0.151). Given the high degree of success
observed in the first study, the high degree of variance observed in the second study, and
previous research indicating a mediational role of intergroup anxiety, the discrepancy
may simply reflect interference from the short-form IAT.
These data are largely consistent with a recent study conducted by Asbrock et al.
(2012), which revealed that social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism
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differentially predict the effects of intergroup contact on prejudicial attitudes. However,
where Asbrock et al. (2012) found direct intergroup contact beneficial for right-wing
authoritarians but not social dominators, the present study reveals a significant effect of
imagined intergroup contact even when controlling for social dominance orientation.
This may be the first time imagined intergroup contact has been shown to have an
advantage of efficacy and opportunity over direct intergroup contact.
Though they have not been operationalized or coded, participants’ reflections on
their experience (which we used as a manipulation check) to both the imagined
interaction (first two reflections) and control condition (second two reflections) are also
revealing:
o He was older, around 50. He had black hair, that was slicked back. His laugh
was low, more like a hard chuckle. We talked about soccer, which he loved to
play as a child. He came to the states to help his family. We then discussed my
family and our traditons. Our families seemed very similar except for our dads.
My dad sounded to be more [ends]
o We were sitting in the north pod of the union. He was wearing a turban and had
darker skin then I do. The things that we had in common were that we both lived
in the same dorm, we both played basketball, we had the same major, and we
were taking similar casses. It seemed that our conversation was a friendly one.
He had a bit of an accent.
Muslims are a very different culture from our own. They dress very differently,
and therefore are rightfully deserving of the term "towel head." They are also
responsible for many terrorist attacks that have happened in the recent past. I
have little ue for these extremist people. They are not good for much else besides
building bombs and taking our jobs away.
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People associate them with terrorists. My father is racist of musslims. I think
muslims are just people like you and me. There are bad muslims and good
muslims just like there are bad christians and good christians. I don't agree with
most of the muslims eliefs. I have nothing against muslims personally. I have met
musslims and thought they were nice people. I have also met some unfriendly
muslims who thought they were superior than I. Just because my father hates
muslims doesn't mean I have to. My s [ends]
These responses from Study 2 illustrate a common theme among respondents
from both samples: the conflation of “Muslim” and “Arab.” Though neither of the two
prompts mentioned race or country of origin, many responses to the manipulation check
referenced language barriers or the Middle East. If the conflation of these two mental
constructs triggers both RWA (social structure and security) and RF (value-violation)
style threat, it may help explain why anti-Muslim prejudice is so strong.
Limitations
Though our research provides compelling evidence to support the efficacy of
imagined intergroup contact among highly ideologically intolerant and cognitively rigid
individuals, it does have a number of limitations.
Although sampling from two different populations—one local and one national—
strengthened the external validity of our findings, our samples from both populations
were predominantly White, and either Christian or non-religiously affiliated. To an
extent however, this was unavoidable, as a more diverse population would have likely
resulted in higher levels of prior real contact with Muslims, and thus fewer ideologically
intolerant individuals (Hodson, 2011). To provide further validity, future research should
be conducted using a more diverse sample.

35

While our initial study suffered from a lack of pretest scores and an unequal
distribution of participant error across condition, leading to slightly disproportionate cell
sizes (44 participants in the control condition versus 31 participants in the experimental
condition), both of these limitations were addressed in Study 2. Neither study, however,
collected information about prior actual contact with Muslims, which would have
allowed us to determine if prior contact was correlated with lower initial levels of
intergroup prejudice.
Lastly, while our control condition has been successfully used in previous
research (Turner et al., 2007; Turner & Crisp, 2010) to ensure that results reflect
imagined intergroup contact, rather than simple stereotype/outgroup priming, additional
control conditions would have further strengthened our findings. Moreover, given our
focus on ideologically intolerant individuals, it is possible that the control task
exacerbated existing prejudices. To rule out this possibility, additional research should
be conducted using alternative control conditions such as no-contact control scenes
(Abrams et al., 2008; Husnu & Crisp, 2010; Turner et al., 2007), and nonrelevant positive
interaction (Stathi & Crisp, 2008). Similarly, future research should be conducted using a
wide array of dependent variables including self-reports (e.g. explicit attitudes, likelihood
of future contact, outgroup variability), IATs, behavioral measures (e.g. resource
distribution games), and physiological measures (e.g. mean arterial pressure, galvanic
skin response, etc.).
Applications and Concluding Remarks
While the ameliorative effects of direct intergroup contact are myriad and well
documented, they are not without significant limitations. As Asbrock et al. (2012)
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demonstrated, direct intergroup contact continues to face issues of efficacy and
opportunity: “SDO prevents engagement in intergroup contact as well as shielding one
from an improvement of outgroup attitudes after contact experiences” (p. 886-887).
The present studies address both of these limitations. Here, we have shown
imagined intergroup contact to be effective among ideologically intolerant and
cognitively rigid individuals in ways that even direct intergroup contact is not. Indeed,
because it requires no actual outgroup contact experience—either direct or extended—
imagined contact is practically applicable even when groups are highly segregated with
little to no motivation for interaction.
However, we do not believe this qualifies it as a suitable replacement for existing
methods of contact (Crisp & Turner, 2009). On the contrary, we believe imagined
intergroup contact is most effective as an intervention technique when used in concert
with other forms of contact. In a diplomatic context—peace talks between Israel and
Palestine, or North and South Korea for example—imagined intergroup contact, if
applied repeatedly and consistently leading up to a summit, may encourage, facilitate,
and enhance direct contact by reducing perceived outgroup threat. Alternatively, in an
educational context, imagined intergroup contact may be helpful in alleviating issues of
racism, homophobia, and religious discrimination if elements were incorporated into
assigned writing prompts. Finally, the present data also suggest that imagined intergroup
contact may prove to be an invaluable tool for researchers seeking to further delineate the
effects of individual difference variables (i.e. right-wing authoritarianism, religious
fundamentalism, and social dominance orientation) on the relationship between contact,
religion, and prejudice.
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Appendix A – Experimetrix Recruitment Statement
Experimetrix Recruitment Statement:
Title – An Imagination Exercise
You are invited to participate in a research study on imagined interactions and
interpersonal attitudes. If you agree to participate, you will be asked to imagine or think
about a specific scenario. After you complete the imagination exercise, you will be asked
several questions about your attitudes and opinions.
This task requires your undivided attention for up to half an hour. Please make sure you
only begin this experiment if you are over 18 and are willing and able to provide that
attention.
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Appendix B—Recruitment Email
Recruitment E-mail
SUBJECT: A Study of Imagined Interaction
Hello,
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by Charles
Bergeron, an undergraduate Psychology–Honors student, and Jordan LaBouff, a College
of Liberal Arts and Sciences–Honors Preceptor of Psychology, at the University of
Maine. The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between interpersonal
experiences and attitudes towards others.
If you decide to participate, you will be asked to perform a simple, five-minute
imaginative exercise before answering a number of questions about yourself, your
attitudes, and your beliefs. The study will take approximately 30 minutes to complete,
and you will receive one hour of research credit as compensation.
For more information, or to complete the survey, please click the link below.
Survey Link
Thank you in advance for your assistance,
Charles Bergeron
Jordan LaBouff, PhD
Department of Psychology
University of Maine, Orono
charles.bergeron@umit.maine.edu
jordan.laBouff@umit.maine.edu
207-581-2826
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Appendix C—UMaine Students’ Informed Consent
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by Charles Bergeron,
an undergraduate Psychology–Honors student, and Jordan LaBouff, a College of Liberal Arts and
Sciences–Honors Preceptor of Psychology at the University of Maine. The purpose of this study
is to investigate the relationship between interpersonal experiences and attitudes towards others.
You must be 18 or older to participate
What Will You Be Asked To Do?
If you decide to participate, you will be asked to perform a simple, five-minute imaginative
exercise before answering a number of questions about yourself, your attitudes, and your beliefs.
It will take approximately 30 minutes to complete this study.
Risks
It is possible that some questions will make you uncomfortable. You may skip any questions that
you do not feel comfortable answering, and you may terminate participation at any time.
Benefits
While there are no direct benefits to you from participating in this study, your participation will
help enhance our understanding of the ways in which our personal experiences shape our attitudes
towards others.
Compensation
You will receive one hour of research credit as compensation for your participation in this
experiment.
Voluntary
Participation is voluntary. You may terminate participation at any time without loss of credit.
Confidentiality
No identifying information will be collected. Anonymous data will be kept indefinitely on a
password-protected drive in a locked laboratory or office.
Contact Information
If you have any questions about the study, please feel free to contact Charles Bergeron—a fifthyear Psychology Honors student pursuing dual bachelor’s degrees in Psychology and Political
Science—or Jordan LaBouff on FirstClass (Charles.Bergeron@umit.maine.edu
Jordan.LaBouff@umit.maine.edu). Additionally, if you have any questions about your rights as a
research participant, please contact Gayle Jones, Assistant to the University of Maine’s Protection
of Human Subjects Review Board, at 207-581-1498 (or e-mail gayle.jones@umit.maine.edu).
“By clicking this link I give my consent to participate in this study. Let’s get started”
“I DO NOT consent to this study and would like to leave this website”
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Appendix D—MTurk Recruitment Statement
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by Charles
Bergeron, an undergraduate Psychology–Honors student, and Jordan LaBouff, a College of
Liberal Arts and Sciences–Honors Preceptor of Psychology at the University of Maine. The
purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between interpersonal experiences and
attitudes towards others.
You must be 18 or older to participate
What Will You Be Asked To Do?
If you decide to participate, you will be asked to perform a simple, five-minute imaginative
exercise before answering a number of questions about yourself, your attitudes, and your
beliefs. It will take approximately 30 minutes to complete this study.
Risks
It is possible that some questions will make you uncomfortable. You may skip any questions
that you do not feel comfortable answering, and you may terminate participation at any time.
Benefits
While there are no direct benefits to you from participating in this study, your participation
will help enhance our understanding of the ways in which our personal experiences shape our
attitudes towards others.
Compensation
You will receive $.25 as compensation for your participation in this experiment.
Voluntary
Participation is voluntary. You may terminate participation at any time without loss of
payment.
Confidentiality
No identifying information will be collected. Anonymous data will be kept indefinitely on a
password-protected drive in a locked laboratory or office.
Contact Information
If you have any questions about the study, please feel free to contact Charles Bergeron or
Jordan LaBouff (Charles.Bergeron@umit.maine.edu; Jordan.LaBouff@umit.maine.edu).
Additionally, if you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, please
contact Gayle Jones, Assistant to the University of Maine’s Protection of Human Subjects
Review Board, at 207-581-1498 (or e-mail gayle.jones@umit.maine.edu).
“By clicking this link I give my consent to participate in this study. Let’s get started”
“I DO NOT consent to this study and would like to leave this website.”
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Appendix E—Questionnaires

DEMOGRAPHICS:
Sex:
Male
Female

Please type your age (in years) in the space provided: _____
With what racial/ethnic group do you most closely identify? (Choose one):
African American / Black
Asian / Pacific Islander
Hispanic
Native American
White
Another race/ethnicity (please specify): _______________

In what socio-economic bracket were you raised for most of your life?
Upper class
Upper-middle class
Middle class
Lower-middle class
Lower class

In what type of area were you raised for most of your life?
A large city
A suburb near a large city
A small city or town
A rural area
I don't know

51

In what type of area are you currently living?
A large city
A suburb near a large city
A small city or town
A rural area
I don't know

Do you believe in God?
Yes
No
Uncertain

What is your primary religious affiliation?
Protestant
Catholic
Buddhist
Hindu
Jewish
Muslim
None
Other religion (please specify): _______________

How interested are you in religion?
1 - Not at all
interested

2

3

4

5Moderately
interested

6

7

8

9Extremely
interested

To what extent do you consider yourself a RELIGIOUS person?
1 - Not at all

2

3

4

5

6

7 - Very much

6

7 - Very much

To what extent do you consider yourself a SPIRITUAL person?
1 - Not at all

2

3

4
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5

How would you describe yourself politically?
Very Conservative
Conservative
Leaning Conservative
Moderate
Leaning Liberal
Liberal
Very Liberal

What is your sexual orientation?
Heterosexual
Homosexual
Bisexual

How many other people are in the same room where you are completing this
survey?
0
1
2
3
4
5+

What other tasks are you doing while you complete this survey (choose ALL that
apply)?
Nothing - only completing this survey
Watching TV
Listening to music
Talking with friends
Reading something else (besides this survey)
Eating
Other (please specify): _______________
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RIGHT WING AUTHORITARIANISM (Smith & Winter, 2002)
Instructions: Please answer the following questions according to how much you
agree or disagree with each statement. You will probably find that you agree with
some of the statements and disagree with others, to varying extents.
What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take
us back to our true path.
1 - Strongly 2 - Moderately 3 - Slightly
disagree
disagree
disagree

4 -Neutral

5 - Slightly 6 - Moderately 7 - Strongly
agree
agree
agree

There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it for
their godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action.
1 - Strongly 2 - Moderately 3 - Slightly
disagree
disagree
disagree

4 - Neutral

5 - Slightly 6 - Moderately 7 - Strongly
agree
agree
agree

Once our government leaders give us the “go-ahead,” it will be the duty of every patriotic
citizen to help stomp out the rot that is poisoning our country from within.
1 - Strongly 2 - Moderately 3 - Slightly
disagree
disagree
disagree

4 - Neutral

5 - Slightly 6 - Moderately 7 - Strongly
agree
agree
agree

It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and
religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create
doubts in people’s minds.
1 - Strongly 2 - Moderately 3 - Slightly
disagree
disagree
disagree

4 - Neutral

5 - Slightly 6 - Moderately 7 - Strongly
agree
agree
agree

It’s better to have trashy magazines and radical pamphlets in our communities than to let
the government have the power to censor them.
1 - Strongly 2 - Moderately 3 - Slightly
disagree
disagree
disagree

4 - Neutral

5 - Slightly 6 - Moderately 7 - Strongly
agree
agree
agree

What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leader in unity.
1 - Strongly 2 - Moderately 3 - Slightly
disagree
disagree
disagree

4 - Neutral
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5 - Slightly 6 - Moderately 7 - Strongly
agree
agree
agree

Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else.
1 - Strongly 2 - Moderately 3 - Slightly
disagree
disagree
disagree

4 - Neutral

5 - Slightly 6 - Moderately 7 - Strongly
agree
agree
agree

Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it
makes them different from everyone else.
1 - Strongly 2 -Moderately
disagree
disagree

3 - Slightly
disagree

4 - Neutral

5 - Slightly 6 - Moderately 7 - Strongly
agree
agree
agree

People should pay less attention to the Bible and other old traditional forms of religious
guidance, and instead develop their own personal standards of what is moral and immoral.
1 - Strongly 2 - Moderately 3 - Slightly
disagree
disagree
disagree

4 - Neutral

5 - Slightly 6 - Moderately 7 - Strongly
agree
agree
agree

There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse.
1 - Strongly 2 - Moderately 3 - Slightly
disagree
disagree
disagree

4 - Neutral

5 - Slightly 6 - Moderately 7 - Strongly
agree
agree
agree

REVISED RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM SCALE (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992)
God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must
be totally followed.
-4 Very
Strongly
Disagree

-2
-3 Strongly Moderately -1 Slightly
Disagree
Disagree
Disagree

0 Neutral

1 Slightly
Agree

2
Moderately 3 Strongly
Agree
Agree

4 Very
Strongly
Agree

No single book of religious teachings contains all the intrinsic, fundamental truths about
life.
-4 Very
Strongly
Disagree

-2
-3 Strongly Moderately -1 Slightly
Disagree
Disagree
Disagree

0 Neutral
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1 Slightly
Agree

2
Moderately 3 Strongly
Agree
Agree

4 Very
Strongly
Agree

The basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is constantly and ferociously fighting
against God.
-4 Very
Strongly
Disagree

-2
-3 Strongly Moderately -1 Slightly
Disagree
Disagree
Disagree

0 Neutral

1 Slightly
Agree

2
Moderately 3 Strongly
Agree
Agree

4 Very
Strongly
Agree

It is more important to be a good person than to believe in God and the right religion.
-4 Very
Strongly
Disagree

-2
-3 Strongly Moderately -1 Slightly
Disagree
Disagree
Disagree

0 Neutral

1 Slightly
Agree

2
Moderately 3 Strongly
Agree
Agree

4 Very
Strongly
Agree

There is a particular set of religious teachings in this world that are so true, you can’t go
any “deeper” because they are the basic, bedrock message that God has given humanity.
-4 Very
Strongly
Disagree

-2
-3 Strongly Moderately -1 Slightly
Disagree
Disagree
Disagree

0 Neutral

1 Slightly
Agree

2
Moderately 3 Strongly
Agree
Agree

4 Very
Strongly
Agree

When you get right down to it, there are basically only two kinds of people in the world: the
Righteous, who will be rewarded by God; and the rest, who will not.
-4 Very
Strongly
Disagree

-2
-3 Strongly Moderately -1 Slightly
Disagree
Disagree
Disagree

0 Neutral

1 Slightly
Agree

2
Moderately 3 Strongly
Agree
Agree

4 Very
Strongly
Agree

Scriptures may contain general truths, but they should NOT be considered completely,
literally true from beginning to end.
-4 Very
Strongly
Disagree

-2
-3 Strongly Moderately -1 Slightly
Disagree
Disagree
Disagree

0 Neutral

1 Slightly
Agree

2
Moderately 3 Strongly
Agree
Agree

4 Very
Strongly
Agree

To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, fundamentally true
religion.
-4 Very
Strongly
Disagree

-2
-3 Strongly Moderately -1 Slightly
Disagree
Disagree
Disagree

0 Neutral
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1 Slightly
Agree

2
Moderately 3 Strongly
Agree
Agree

4 Very
Strongly
Agree

“Satan” is just the name people give to their own bad impulses. There really is no such
thing as a diabolical “Prince of Darkness” who tempts us.
-4 Very
Strongly
Disagree

-2
-3 Strongly Moderately -1 Slightly
Disagree
Disagree
Disagree

0 Neutral

1 Slightly
Agree

2
Moderately 3 Strongly
Agree
Agree

4 Very
Strongly
Agree

Whenever science and sacred scripture conflict, science is probably right.
-4 Very
Strongly
Disagree

-2
-3 Strongly Moderately -1 Slightly
Disagree
Disagree
Disagree

0 Neutral

1 Slightly
Agree

2
Moderately 3 Strongly
Agree
Agree

4 Very
Strongly
Agree

The fundamentals of God’s religion should never be tampered with, or compromised with
others’ beliefs.
-4 Very
Strongly
Disagree

-2
-3 Strongly Moderately -1 Slightly
Disagree
Disagree
Disagree

0 Neutral

1 Slightly
Agree

2
Moderately 3 Strongly
Agree
Agree

4 Very
Strongly
Agree

All of the religions in the world have flaws and wrong teachings. There is no perfectly true,
right religion.
-4 Very
Strongly
Disagree

-2
-3 Strongly Moderately -1 Slightly
Disagree
Disagree
Disagree

0 Neutral
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1 Slightly
Agree

2
Moderately 3 Strongly
Agree
Agree

4 Very
Strongly
Agree

SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION (Prato, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994)
Instructions: Which of the following objects or statements do you have a positive or
negative feeling towards? Beside each object or statement, choose a number from “1” to
“7” which represents the degree of your positive or negative feeling.
4Neither
3positive
1 - Very
2Slightly
nor
negative Negative negative negative

Some groups of people are simply
not the equals of others.
Equality.
It is important that we treat other
countries as equals.
This country would be better off if
we cared less about how equal all
people were.
To get ahead in life, it is sometimes
necessary to step on others.
In an ideal world, all nations would
be equal.
Increased social equality.
If people were treated more equally
we would have fewer problems in
this country.
It is not a problem if some people
have more of a chance in life than
others.
We should try to treat one another as
equals as much as possible. (All
humans should be treated equally).
Some people are just more worthy
than others.
Increased economic quality.
Some people are just inferior to
others.
Some people are just more deserving
than others.
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5Slightly
positive

6Positive

7 - Very
positive

ANTI-MUSLIM ATTITUDE ITEMS
Please rate how warm or cold you feel toward the following groups (0° coldest feelings, 50° neutral
feelings, 100° warmest feelings):
0°

10°

20°

30°

40°

50°

60°

70°

80°

90°

100°

Muslims
Arabic
persons
Instructions: Which of the following statements do you have a positive or negative feeling towards?
For each statement, mark a number from “1” to “7” which represents the degree of your positive or
negative feeling. Remember, your first reaction is best. Work as quickly as you can.
Very
Negative
1

2

3

4

5

6

Very
Positive
7

Most of the terrorists in the world today are
Muslims.
Historically, Muslims have made important
contributions to the world culture.
Muslims have little appreciation for democratic
values.
People of the Muslim religion tend to be fanatical.
Muslims value peace and love.

INTERGROUP ANXIETY – Adapted from Stephan and Stephan, 1985
Imagine that you will be asked to complete a group project with a Muslim partner. Please indicate
the extent to which you feel the emotions below in anticipating your interactions with this partner.
Clearly does
not describe
my feelings

Mostly does
not describe
my feelings

Confident
Irritated
Awkward
Impatient
Frustrated
Stressed
Happy
Self-conscious
Defensive
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Somewhat
describes my
feelings

Mostly
describes my
feelings

Clearly
describes my
feelings

Appendix F

On the next page, you will find a table like the one below with different categories. You will
have 30 seconds to correctly categorize as many terms as possible (on the left side of the
page) by clicking the button under the proper category. After 30 seconds, the survey will
automatically advance to the next page. Please work as quickly and accurately as possible,
categorizing each item before moving on to the next.
If you understand and are ready to proceed, please click below.

FLOWER - PLEASANT / INSECT UNPLEASANT
Flower
Pleasant
Rose
Poison
Ant
Good
Daffodil
Love
Mosquito
Anger
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Insect
Unpleasant
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